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Dynamic House Prices and Trading Volumes across 
Quality Tiers and Upward Mobility 
 
 
Lok Sang Ho*, Yue Ma+ and Donald R. Haurin^ 
 
 
Abstract 
 We argue that shocks to a housing market are transmitted through 
the hierarchy of quality tiers within a housing market. The result is the 
prediction of waves of house price changes accompanied by changes in 
transaction volume. Our study is related to existing models of spatial 
ripple effects across housing markets.  The data are from the Hong 
Kong housing market. The findings from Granger causality tests 
strongly support the argument that ripple or domino effects within a 
single housing market occur in response to external shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
 Housing market dynamics are complex. Theoretical approaches 
include models of neighborhood change, filtering, urban growth, and 
housing chains. Empirical tests of these models are relatively infrequent, 
perhaps due to the complexity of the models or the lack of data. 
However, given the importance of home equity to national wealth and 
the importance of housing to urban and national economies, there is a 
need for studies of house price and transaction dynamics. 
 Our study focuses on the interrelationships of housing submarkets 
where the submarkets are defined by quality tiers. The application is to 
Hong Kong, this locality being chosen because their changes in housing 
policy form a natural experiment and data are available. One implication 
of the empirical findings is that houses of all quality levels are closely 
tied together through dynamic processes. Another finding is that price 
effects move through the quality continuum of a housing market with 
relatively great rapidity. A third is that there is a positive correlation 
between the turnover rate of housing and house prices, reaffirming a 
relationship found in recent studies of housing markets. 
 
2. Review of Approaches to Housing Market Dynamics 
 The dynamics of housing markets is first described using a variety 
of approaches. We will review filtering models, then models describing 
spatial ripples in house price changes. Finally, we review search and 
equity effect models, these focusing on the short run consequences of 
shocks to the housing market on price and turnover rates. Each of these 
models plays a role in guiding our theoretical approach to housing 
dynamics.1  
 The seminal contributions to the theoretical description of the 
filtering model were the papers by Sweeney (1974a, 1974b). In filtering 
models, the housing market is separated into distinct quality levels. In 
equilibrium households are matched to houses of different qualities 
according to their income levels and willingness to pay. The model 
predicts the long run equilibrium distributions of the quality of housing 
units and prices.  
 In this model, if a set of households’ incomes rise, the group 
trades up for the next higher quality homes and the vacant homes 
                                                 
1 Review articles of some aspects of house price dynamics include Gatzlaff and Tirtiroglu 
(1995) and Cho (1996), both focusing on housing market efficiency. 
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become available to a lower income group.  The short run equilibrium is 
disturbed, causing further substitution producing a ripple effect 
throughout the quality continuum. One limitation of Sweeney’s model is 
that landlords do not face a down payment constraint when purchasing 
housing. Thus, the dynamics caused by the interaction of the down 
payment constraint and household equity levels are excluded from the 
model. 
 “Ripple effects” in regional house prices have been the focus of 
many studies, particularly in the United Kingdom (Alexander and 
Barrow 1994, Meen 1999, 2002.)2 It is fairly well established that house 
price ripples occur in the U.K. flowing from the southeastern region to 
the north. Meen suggests that ripple effects could be caused by four 
factors: migration, different reaction speeds to shocks, spatial arbitrage, 
and home equity effects.  
 Migration could cause house price ripples if households relocate 
in response to changes in the spatial distribution in house prices (Jones 
and Leishman 2006). A ripple-like effect also could be observed if 
regions react to economic shocks with different speeds. Meen’s third 
explanation is based on the spatial diffusion of house prices, a 
manifestation of arbitrage mitigated by search costs. Pollakowski and 
Ray (1997) used a VAR model to test whether house price changes in 
one region or primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) predict price 
changes in other regions or PMSAs. Their work built on Tirtiroglu 
(1992) and Clapp and Tirtiroglu (1994) who found that excess returns in 
a housing submarket diffused to other submarkets of the same 
metropolitan statistical area. Pollakowski and Ray found statistically 
significant cross-market housing price effects at the regional level, but 
the pattern of results was not economically sensible. They also found 
significant cross-PMSA effects in the New York consolidated 
metropolitan statistical area, with a slight preponderance of effects being 
for contiguous areas.   
 Meen’s fourth explanation is based on Stein’s (1995) model where 
equity effects are incorporated into the housing market. Stein’s notes 
that households who wish to own must make a down payment and pay 
closing costs. If house prices are rising, current owners’ home equity 
                                                 
2  Oikarinen (2006) studied the Finnish housing market and finds evidence that house 
prices changes move from central city to surrounding area. Cook has numerous studies 
(2006) of ripple effects in the U.K. housing market. 
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rises, increasing their wealth and allowing them to make a larger down 
payment on another, more expensive, home. Thus, increased house 
prices facilitate trading-up and thus transaction volume should increase. 
Stein showed that this effect is enhanced if minimum down payment 
requirements constrain a large percentage of current owners’ choice of 
dwelling. Similarly, if house prices fall, a household’s equity falls, and 
this household’s ability to purchase another house is reduced, perhaps 
greatly. Transaction volume should fall at the same time that house 
prices are falling. One test of Stein’s hypothesis was by Lamont and 
Stein (1999) who found that real house prices are more sensitive to 
shocks to per capita income in cities where a relatively high percentage 
of homeowners have a high loan to value ratio. 
 Hort (2000) also argued that changes in the turnover rate in 
housing are linked with changes in house prices. The basis for this 
argument is a search model developed by Berkovec and Goodman 
(1996). Hort explained that sellers establish list prices based on their 
expectations of sales prices, these expectations influenced by recent 
market prices and the recent “ease of selling”. Buyers’ offers are 
influenced by recent prices but also are subject to demand shocks such 
as unexpected changes in unemployment, income, population growth, 
mortgage interest rates, and migration. Thus, the distribution of buyers’ 
offers moves before that of sellers’ reservation prices. The result is a 
rapid change in the turnover rate as the market quickly clears in up-
markets and houses remain unsold in down-markets.3  Initially there is 
little upward price movement in the up-market because sellers have 
previously set list prices based on the set of price expectations at the 
time of listing. There is little downward price movement initially in a 
down-market because even though houses remain unsold, those that sell 
do so near their list price (skimming off the upper tail of the distribution 
of buyers’ offers). However, as sellers become aware of the change in 
the expected marketing time for a home, they adjust their list prices, 
inducing a positive correlation between the turnover rate and house 
price changes. Hort (2000) found the dynamics of the Swedish housing 
market followed this model’s predictions. 
 
                                                 
3  This model is further elaborated in Fisher et al. (2003) where it is applied to the 
commercial property market.  
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3. The Model 
 The literature suggests a number of reasons why external shocks 
to a housing market could lead to the observation of a chain of house 
price changes. We next present a stylized model of a housing market 
with multiple quality levels of housing, matching its structure to that of 
our data set from the Hong Kong housing market. This focus results in 
particular assumptions, relevant for Hong Kong, that simplify the model. 
More general models can be found in Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006), 
and Gervais (2002). We also highlight the role of changes in wealth and 
the repercussions in the housing market. The role of housing as an 
investment good and store of wealth has been highlighted by Henderson 
and Ioannides (1983). 
 Renters live in the lowest quality tier, and there are two quality 
levels of owner-occupied housing (this being generalizable to many 
quality levels). Household wealth plays a prominent role in determining 
housing demand, and we include a down payment constraint. When a 
positive shock to the wealth of renter households occurs, it increases the 
demand for the lowest tier owner-occupied houses, thus increasing their 
price. This price increase subsequently leads to greater demand and 
price increases in higher quality tiers of the housing market. Similarly, 
the increase in transactions among lower tier housing temporally leads 
increases in transaction volume in higher quality markets. These 
responses in price and volume can be characterized as a “domino effect” 
flowing through the quality continuum.  Negative price shocks to the 
lowest quality tier of housing or the rental market will have similar 
effects in the opposite direction, leading to downward pressure on house 
prices and reductions in transaction volume in higher quality tiers.  We 
expect that the effect will be larger among households that are down 
payment constrained. 
 
3.1 The Market Structure 
 The market structure we consider includes a rental housing market 
and two types of owner-occupied housing: low (A) and high (B) quality. 
We assume that housing in the rental market is lower quality than 
owner-occupied housing and it is provided by the government to 
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accommodate lower income people. 4  All households are utility 
maximizers. Rental housing tenants may choose to upgrade their 
housing and become homeowners when it is advantageous to do so. 
Owner-occupiers also may buy and sell property. We also assume that 
dwelling units in each category of housing are homogeneous and each 
household occupies only one unit of housing. The model considers the 
response to a positive shock to the wealth of renters. 
 The total stock of low-quality owner-occupied housing at the end 
of a period is given by:  
(1) SA = HA + θA ( AA pp − ),  θA > 0 for AA pp >     
where HA is the initial housing stock at the beginning of the period. θA is 
a supply response coefficient that generates additional supply by the end 
of the period whenever housing price AA pp > . Thus, any new demand (nA) 
has to be met either by sales of existing houses (iA) and/or by additional 
supply from developers.  
 Similarly, the supply of high-quality homes B depends on its 
housing price pc: 
(2) SB = HB + θB ( BB pp − ),  θB> 0 for BB pp >   
The critical supply prices, Ap  and Bp , are exogenous and represent 
prices below which developers in each of the markets would not find it 
profitable to supply new housing.5  
 In the initial state of steady state equilibrium, demand for housing 
is equal to the stock of housing for each market, and renters live in 
residences supplied by the government.  For simplicity we assume 
depreciation is zero.   
 Suppose the initial equilibrium price of low-quality housing is Ap  
and the number of households who own homes is iA. Thus the initial 
total demand for housing stock in A is iA hA. Given the supply of housing 
A in (1), we have market A’s stock equilibrium condition: 
(3) iA hA = HA.     
Similarly, suppose the initial equilibrium price of the high-quality 
market B before any shocks occur is Bp , and the number of households 
                                                 
4 This assumption is reasonable for our application to Hong Kong. It also provides a 
mechanism for introducing exogenous shocks to the rental market through changes in 
government policies. Shocks could also be introduced through a private sector rental 
market.  
5 That is, they represent construction and land costs. 
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who own homes in market B is iB. Market B’s stock equilibrium 
condition is: 
(4) iB hB = HB.         
Because B is the highest quality housing market, it is assumed that 
homeowners cannot trade up further. This assumption can be relaxed 
and the results inferred from activities in market A.  
 Additional new demand for high-quality homes (nB) has to be met 
by the expansion of the supply, triggered by a price of pB beyond Bp . 
From this initial equilibrium, we examine the implications of rental 
tenants’ wealth increasing (Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2006).  When 
tenants in government provided housing have acquired sufficient 
savings, their utility maximizing behavior will lead them to bid for 
housing in market A and become first-time homeowners (Bardhan, et al. 
2003). 
 
3.2 The Model’s Solution 
 In Appendix A, we describe the simplifying assumptions that 
convert a household’s dynamic optimization problem into a static 
optimization problem. The equilibrium solution of the two housing 
markets is derived in Appendix B. A variable list of the model is given 
at the end of Appendix B. We assume all households have identical 
utility functions but have different amounts of lifetime wealth. The 
lifetime wealth of the household, K, comprises the present value of all 
future income plus the value of all assets. For someone who becomes a 
homeowner at the end of period t-1, the value of K at the end of period t 
is: 
(5) Kt = Kt-1 + capital appreciation through time t.  
 We assume that wealth varies among households and they can be 
sorted by wealth in descending order from largest to smallest with 
unique index i. For simplicity, we assume the distribution of K is a 
linear function of i, with the total number of households assumed to be 
equal to τK2 . Suppressing the time period subscripts, the wealth of 
household i is:  
(6) τ/2)( iKiK −= .  
Thus, the greatest wealth of any households is K2 , the lowest wealth is 
zero, and the average wealth is K . Hence, for a critical value K*, we 
have: 
(7) *2* KKi ττ −=           
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where i* gives the number of households with wealth greater than or 
equal to K*.  
 We next determine the demand for housing in the low-quality 
housing market A after a positive shock to renters’ wealth has occurred. 
Changing wealth impacts housing choices directly as a household’s 
lifetime wealth changes and also through the effects of the down 
payment constraint. Household i will purchase a house if and only if its 
wealth K(i) is greater than a critical value K*A ,  
(8) K(i) > K*A =ϕA pA - ϕRA      
where K*A defined in equation (A17) of Appendix A,6 and ϕA and ϕRA 
are parameters defined also in this appendix. Otherwise, the household 
will not purchase a house and will remain in the rental market. 
 The number of renter households (nA’) that satisfy the wealth 
constraint and intend to change to ownership in market A is found by 
substituting (9) into (7), yielding:  
(9) nA’ RAAAA pKKK ϕτϕττττ +−=−= '2'2  *  
where pA is market A’s new price to be determined by the market 
equilibrium condition, which has now been affected with the average 
wealth changing from K  to 'K .  
 Suppose there is an additional ‘liquid wealth’ (W) constraint, at 
time t, following Stein's (1995) down payment hypothesis: 
 WA ≥ c.q +(1- ϕL) pAhA  
where time subscript t is omitted for simplicity. WA is the ‘liquid wealth’ 
at time t for a potential buyer in market A, this defined as anything that 
the household currently owns that can be sold reasonably quickly for 
money without incurring a loss.  Also, hA is the size of one unit of 
housing in market A, pA is the price of housing in market A, (1- ϕL) is 
the percentage of down-payment defined in Appendix A(ii), (1- ϕL)pAhA 
is the amount of down payment, and c and q are the quantity and price 
of the composite nonhousing goods, respectively. 
 Suppose at time t, only a proportion (γA) of households 
simultaneously satisfy the wealth constraint and the liquid wealth 
constraint. The number of households satisfying the lifetime wealth 
constraint is given by (9), nA’. Therefore the additional number of 
households satisfying both the total and liquid wealth constraints and 
thus are able to afford a home in market A is:  
                                                 
6 The proof is provided in Appendix A. 
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(10) nA=γA nA’ )'2(  A RAAA pK ϕτϕττγ +−=  
Equation (10) implies that nA increases with the mean wealth 'K  and 
decreases with housing price pA. From equation (B6) of Appendix B, we 
have the following result. 
Proposition 1. A positive shock d K  to the wealth of renters, who are 
potential buyers in the low-quality housing market, will increase the 
prices of homes in market A.  This is indicated by: 
 02 >∆=
AAA h
Kd
dp γτ , 
where ∆  is defined in equation (B5) of Appendix B and it is shown to 
be positive. 
 We now consider the transmission of the renter wealth shock 
through market A to the high-quality housing market B. The availability 
of units in market A for renters who wish to buy is subject to the 
willingness of existing homeowners to sell. This willingness is 
conditional on their utilities being higher after trading up to market B 
compared with staying put.  
 The wealth of households in market A as potential buyers in 
market B can be represented by: 
 KnB(i, t)= KiA(i,t-1)+ pA (t)hA - pA(t-1)hA -Ψm 
where Ψm is the remaining mortgage. Suppressing the time indices t and 
t-1, and rewriting pA(t-1)hA +Ψm as φm, the mean wealth nBK  of the 
potential buyers in market B is given by: 
(11) mAAiAnB hpKK φ−+=   
where iAK  is the mean wealth of KiA(i,t-1). Equation (11) implies that an 
increase of the price in the low-quality housing market will increase the 
wealth of potential buyers; that is: 
(12) 0>=∂
∂
A
A
nB h
p
K . 
 Potential buyers in market B also are potential sellers in market A. 
But the actual number of sellers is given below by (13) after 
incorporating a down payment constraint similar to that in market A [cf. 
(10)]: 
(13) nB = γB ( 2τ nBK  - τ K*B ) = γB ( 2τ nBK  - τ ϕB pB + τ ϕBA pA - τ ϕB0 ) 
where pA and pB are housing prices to be determined by the market 
equilibrium condition, K*B, ϕB, ϕBA and ϕB0 are defined in equation 
(A20) of Appendix A, and γB is the proportion of households satisfying 
the total wealth constraint that also satisfy the liquid wealth constraint.  
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 We assume there are no households in market B that sell their 
houses and thus all new demand must be met by estate developers. Thus 
the total demand in market B is nBhB + iBhB, which must equal total 
supply [cf. (2)]. Hence: 
(14) nBhB + iBhB = θB ( pB - Bp ) + HB. 
Substituting (4) and (13) into (14), we have: 
(15) γB ( 2τ nBK  hB - τ ϕB pB hB + τ ϕBA pA hB - τ ϕB0 hB ) = θB( pB - Bp ). 
Solving for the house price level yields: 
(16) 
BBBB
BBBBBBBBAABnBB
B h
phhpKh
p γϕτθ
θγϕτγϕτγτ
+
+−+= 02 . 
From (16) we find: 
(17) 02 >+=∂
∂
BBBB
BB
nB
B
h
h
K
p
γτϕθ
γτ  
which leads to proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. A price increase in the low-quality market will increase 
the price of the high-quality market through the channels of: (i) a wealth 
effect, and (ii) a substitution effect.  
Proof. 
From (16), we have: 
(18) 0>+=∂
∂
BBBB
BBBA
A
B
h
h
p
p
γτϕθ
γτϕ  
hence, 
(19) 
A
B
A
nB
nB
B
A
B
p
p
p
K
K
p
dp
dp
∂
∂+



∂
∂




∂
∂=  0]2[ >+
+=
BBBB
BBBAA
h
hh
γτϕθ
γτϕ . 
To the extent that this is a process that takes time, we expect that in our 
empirical test that price changes in the low quality market will lead 
price changes in the high quality market.  
 The wealth effect is given by 



∂
∂




∂
∂
A
nB
nB
B
p
K
K
p . The first term, 
nB
B
K
p
∂
∂ , 
and the second term, 
A
nB
p
K
∂
∂ , can derived from (16) and (12), respectively. 
Both terms are positive, which implies that increased low-quality 
housing prices will raise the wealth of the homeowners in market A who 
are considering moving to market B. 
 The substitution effect is given by 
A
B
p
p
∂
∂ , which is obtained directly 
from (18). The substitution effect is positive because the houses in the 
low- and high-quality markets are substitutes. Increased low-quality 
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housing prices will reduce the demand for the houses in this market and 
will induce demand for high-quality houses. As a result, the housing 
price in the high-quality market rises. 
 Combining the results in Proposition 1 and 2, we have: 
Proposition 3. A positive shock to the wealth of potential buyers in the 
low-quality market will increase house prices in the high-quality market. 
Proof. 
(20) 




∂
∂+



∂
∂




∂
∂=




=
''' Kd
dp
p
p
p
K
K
p
Kd
dp
dp
dp
Kd
dp A
A
B
A
nB
nB
BA
A
BB     
 0
)(
]2[2 2 >+∆
+=
BBBB
BABAABA
h
hhh
γϕτθ
γγϕτ  
where ∆>0 is defined in equation (B5) of Appendix B. This expression 
is derived directly from Propositions 2 and 3. 
 We summarize the transmission channels of a positive wealth 
shock 'K  initiated in the low-quality housing market A as follows: 
(i) The shock raises housing prices in market A: 0
'
>
Kd
dpA , [Proposition 1]. 
(ii) The increase in pA increases the wealth of households in market A, 
some of whom then enter the next highest quality housing market B: 
0>∂
∂
A
nB
p
K , [(12)]. 
(iii) The house price increase in A is transmitted to house prices in the 
high-quality housing market via the increase of the wealth of 
households in market A: 0>∂
∂
nB
B
K
p , [(17)]. 
(iv) The house price increase in A also increases the price of high-
quality housing through the substitution effect: 0>∂
∂
A
B
p
p  [(18)].  
(v) Based on (i) to (iv) above, we find that a positive shock initiated in 
the rental market will be transmitted throughout all levels of the housing 
market, eventually to the highest quality level: 
0
'''
>




∂
∂+



∂
∂




∂
∂=




=
Kd
dp
p
p
p
K
K
p
Kd
dp
dp
dp
Kd
dp A
A
B
A
nB
nB
BA
A
BB . 
 The model implies that the transmission channel of a positive 
wealth shock is unidirectional; that is, the causality goes from the low-
quality market to the high-quality market. Exogenous positive shocks 
initiated from the high-quality market, (KBX), will not be transmitted into 
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the low-quality market A; that is: 0=∂
∂
B
A
p
p . 7  Thus, we find that 
0=






=
BX
B
B
A
BX
A
dK
dp
dp
dp
dK
dp . The reason is that this shock will elicit a supply 
adjustment in the high-quality market and the resulting housing price 
increase. Households in the next lower housing market could not 
“afford” a home in the high quality market prior to the shock and thus 
they certainly cannot afford the new price. Thus, there is no change in 
either demand or supply in the lower quality market; hence, its house 
price will not be affected by the positive shock in the higher quality 
market.8 
 Finally, from equation (B10) of Appendix B, we have the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 4. Increasing the number of transactions for lower tier 
housing nA will tend to increase the number of transactions for higher 
tier housing nB,  
 0 >
A
B
dn
dn . 
 
4. The Hong Kong Housing Market 
 Hong Kong provides a unique opportunity to test this theory (see 
Ho (2006) for additional description of the Hong Kong market). About 
40 percent of the population lived in public rental housing during the 
1980s.9 Public rental housing (PRH) accounts for about 70 percent of 
the total public housing program, the remaining 30 percent being in the 
form of “Home Ownership Scheme” housing (HOS). Heavy subsidies 
provided a significant incentive for households to remain in the public 
rental sector even for those who had the resources to become 
                                                 
7 Recall that we do not allow for depreciation of housing and thus we do not allow for 
effects through filtering as in Sweeney’s (1974a, 1974b) models. 
8 One could model a negative shock to a high quality market B. Some households in 
market B would move into low quality market A. Market A would benefit from the new 
demand as price of housing in market A rises, and thus supply rises too. The renter 
market could be affected in the sense that renters who otherwise would have moved to 
market A could find that the prices is not affordable and so they will remain in the rental 
market longer than otherwise. Due to space constraints, a formal analysis of these effects 
is deferred to future research. 
9 Hong Kong’s population was 5.7 million in 1990 and 6.7 million in 2000. In 2000, there 
were 2.1 million dwelling units.  
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homeowners.10 Nevertheless, every year there is a stream of purchasers 
from among the PRH who buy private housing for investment purposes 
as well as to improve their housing conditions. In 1996 and 1997, 
almost 10,000 households per year moved to owned private/HOS 
housing from public rental housing units, probably reflecting a 
perceived stepping up of the policy to make richer tenants pay higher 
rent and a new policy to make the tenure in public rental housing not 
inheritable.  
 For many years the typical loan-to-value ratio in Hong Kong’s 
banks was 70% of the appraised value of the property. Thus the down 
payment requirement posed a significant constraint to potential buyers. 
Most households of modest means were equity constrained and needed 
to get a committed buyer before moving to a better housing unit. This 
effect is somewhat less likely to occur among higher income 
homeowners because the down payment constraint was less likely to be 
binding.  
 Beginning in April 1987, the Hong Kong Housing Authority 
undertook a series of policy changes that decreased the incentive for 
households to remain in public rental housing.11 First, it required tenants 
who had been housed for over ten years in the program and who had 
income exceeding twice that of the Waiting List Income Limit, (WLIL) 
to pay double rent.12 The Housing Authority relaxed this requirement 
slightly in April 1993, when households with income exceeding twice 
the WLIL were required to pay 1.5 times the rent, while those with 
                                                 
10 With average rent set at no more than 10 per cent of the median household income of 
tenants, the implicit subsidies in public rental housing were substantial. Also, until quite 
recently Hong Kong protected the tenure of public housing tenants. Regardless of changes 
in financial conditions, a family and its children could remain in the unit (Housing 
Authority 1993). These subsidies provided a significant incentive for households to 
remain in the public rental sector even though they had the resources to become 
homeowners. In 1996 the Housing Authority recommended that household income and net 
asset value determine PRH household's eligibility to continue to receive public housing 
subsidy (Housing Authority 1996). PRH tenants whose household income and net asset 
value exceed the prescribed limits, or who choose not to make a declaration, have to pay 
market rent. 
11 The Housing Authority is a statutory body set up by the Hong Kong government. The 
Authority has responsibility for housing matters and public housing development.  
12 The Housing Authority maintains a waiting list for applicants to public housing. The total 
monthly income of the applicant and his/her family members must not exceed the 
maximum limits as stated by the Housing Authority. The incentive to invest in homes also 
was encouraged by high inflation and buttressed by a rapidly growing economy. 
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income exceeding three times the WLIL had to pay double the rent.13 In 
April 1996, public policy changed again. Tenants of public housing 
whose household income and net asset value exceeded prescribed limits 
had to pay market rent (Housing Authority 1995, 1996).  With such 
policies in place, and with a booming economy offering opportunities 
for upward mobility, it came as no surprise that a survey conducted by 
the Housing Authority in 1992-1993 showed that 24 per cent of home 
purchases in the market were by public housing tenants and that over 13 
per cent of tenants owned one or more residential properties. This 
activity was clearly also a result of the sizable savings accumulated 
during the high growth and high inflation period in the 1980s and early 
1990s (Watanabe, 1998).14 
 The final change in public policy that we consider was announced 
on December 8, 1997. The “Tenants Purchase Scheme” (TPS) allowed 
existing public rental housing tenants to purchase their own flats at up to 
an 88 percent discount from the estimated market price, provided that 
the sitting tenants committed to buy within a specified period. The units 
were priced from about HK$ 70,000 (less than US$ 10,000) to about 
HK$ 300,000. The scheme was implemented in phases, with each phase 
covering about 25,000 tenants, starting in 1998. This policy reversed the 
previous incentive of tenants in public rental housing to leave their 
dwellings and move into the ownership market. 
 The announcement of the TPS program in 1997 greatly changed 
the incentive structure for existing tenants in the public rental program. 
They no longer had reason to buy expensive HOS housing or private 
sector homes. Even rich tenants could purchase the rental unit at 
discounted prices. The expected effect would be to greatly reduce the 
flow of these households into the private sector ownership market. 
                                                 
13 Rent in public sector rental housing is inclusive of “rates,” which are similar to the U.S. 
property tax. Specifically, rates are a tax levied on the “ratable value” of the property as 
assessed by the Rating and Valuation Department. 
14 For example, Wanatabe (1998) reports that mean monthly household savings in 1989-90 
by households residing in the Housing Authority’s rental flats (PRH) program was HK$ 
636 and their mean monthly expenditure was HK$ 7,364. For PRH participants in the 50th 
to 74th income deciles, the mean monthly savings increased to HK$ 2,924. For those PRH 
renters in the 75th to 89th income deciles, monthly savings was HK$ 6,459 and those in the 
top 10% of the income distribution saved HK$ 16,635 per month. The high amounts of 
savings increased in the early 1990s; for example, the amount was HK$ 15,716 for those 
in the 75th to 89th income deciles and similarly greater than 1989-90 for other income 
levels. 
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Figure 1 shows a general upwards trend in property transactions (mainly 
residential, but also inclusive of commercial and industrial) from 1987 
through 1997 (but there was a downwards trend from 1991 through 
1996), but then a dramatic decline following the announcement of the 
TPS in December 1997. These data generally correspond to our 
expectations, but they report only the aggregate number of transactions 
while our interest focuses on ripple effects within the quality continuum. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
5. Data and Empirical Tests 
 House price data for four classes of housing from the period 1987 
to 2004 were obtained from the Hong Kong Rating and Valuation 
Department. The housing classes are defined according to the size of 
housing unit: Class A (under 40 m2), Class B (40-60 m2), Class C (70-
99.9 m2), and Class D (100 m2 and above).15 The Ratings and Valuation 
Department house price indices “are designed to measure rental and 
price changes with quality kept at a constant” (Hong Kong Property 
Review 2001).16 We expect that the above described changes in housing 
policy would first affect house prices in Class A units, followed by B, C, 
and D.  
 Our second data set relates to monthly transaction volume data for 
1995 to 2004. These data pertain to existing private housing transactions 
and were obtained from the Land Registry: Centaline Databank 
Management Department. We separate properties by price and observe 
the time series of transactions. House price categories are: Home 
Ownership Scheme housing (HOS), 1-2 million $HK, 2-3 million, 3-5 
million, and 5-10 million.  
 
5.1 Housing Price Dynamics Test 
 The first empirical test is a causality test of whether house price 
changes in smaller properties lead those in larger properties throughout 
                                                 
15 All units are private domestic units, this defined as independent dwellings with separate 
cooking facilities and bathroom/lavatory. Our class D merges class D and class E data 
from the official definition. 
16 The house price index is derived using all transactions that occurred in a particular period 
in a particular class of dwelling. The index accounts for variations in property size and 
quality by comparing transaction price to the ratable value of the property. Thus, observed 
variations in nominal house prices are compared with a time invariant value, yielding 
measures of the change in price.  
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the distribution of property sizes. Under the standard Granger test 
(1969), if X causes Y, then changes in X should precede changes in Y. 
That is, lagged values of X can help improve the prediction of current 
values of Y. First, we estimate the unrestricted model: 
(20) tt
k
i
it
k
i
itt XYY εβαµ +++= −
=
−
=
∑∑ 1
1
1
1
.        
Next we estimate the restricted model: 
(21) tt
k
i
itt YY εαµ ++= −
=
∑ 1
1
. 
The null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y (Ho : β1= β2= ··· = 
βk =0) can be tested by the reported F-statistics. If the coefficients on the 
lagged values of X are jointly and significantly different from zero, the 
null hypothesis can be rejected. Y is said to be Granger-caused by X.17 
 We begin the analysis by checking the stationarity of the price 
series using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. This check is 
necessary because the Granger Causality tests require all time series be 
stationary. Table 1 shows that the null hypothesis that the price series 
contain a unit root cannot be rejected for any series, indicating they are 
non-stationary. Each variable was transformed into a first-difference 
form to achieve stationarity. In implementing equation (1), in order to 
avoid the ambiguity in choosing the lag lengths, we use the Akaike’s 
final prediction error criterion to determine the optimal lag 
specifications. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
 Six sets of the Granger test results are reported in Table 2. 
Although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that “the price 
movements of Class A do not cause those in Class B,” we can reject the 
null that price movements in Class A do not cause those in Class C (1% 
level) and Class D (1% level). Also, we can reject the null hypotheses 
that “price movements in Class B do not cause those in Class C “(1% 
level) and “price movements in Class B do not cause those in Class D” 
(1% level). Similarly, we can reject the null that “price movements in 
                                                 
17 The VECM approach (standard Granger causality test augmented with error-correction 
terms) is not applicable here because these variables are not cointegrated during the period 
1987 to 2000. The absence of cointegration notwithstanding, a short run causal relation 
may still exist, which can be determined using the conventional Granger causality test 
(VAR approach). 
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Class C do not cause those in Class D” (5% level). All of these results 
support the hypotheses that price changes in low quality properties lead 
those of higher quality properties during this period. A ripple effect of 
prices upwards through the quality continuum is apparent. 
 We also find that the Granger tests do not support reverse 
causality. Price changes in Class B, C, and D do not Granger cause 
those in Class A. Neither do price changes in Class C or D Granger 
cause those in Class B. Finally, we find that price changes in Class D do 
not Granger cause those in Class C. Thus, all of the tests support a 
single direction of the price ripple as predicted by the model. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
5.2 Housing Transaction Dynamics Test 
 In a market where many households are down payment-
constrained, the model predicts patterns in the number of transactions, 
again beginning with low quality housing and continuing upwards 
through the quality continuum. Our base level is the publicly subsidized 
Homeownership Scheme housing (HOS). Typically, the households 
who are HOS owners were previously tenants in public rental housing 
and they were given preference as “green form applicants”, although the 
public may apply as “white form applicants” by satisfying specified 
income and asset level tests. As described above, after December 1997 
when the TPS was announced, public rental housing tenants’ demand 
for HOS housing fell dramatically because they could purchase their 
rental unit at as low as 12% of the estimated market price. This drop in 
demand for HOS housing should reduce transaction volume, price, and 
equity among HOS owners. Our model predicts that negative effects on 
HOS transactions would be transmitted upwards through the quality 
continuum.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
 Our results are reported in Table 3. The total number of 
transactions over the period from 1995 to 2004 by house value category 
ranges from 182,510 in the one to two million $HK category, to 94,341 
for two to three million $HK, to 75,702 for three to five million $HK, to 
42,430 for five to ten million $HK. We find that changes in the 
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transaction volume of HOS housing Granger-caused changes in 
transaction volume in all higher valued housing. This is convincing 
evidence that the lowest tier of housing quality was the leading 
submarket in terms of changing transaction volume. There is no 
evidence of reverse causality from higher to lower quality levels.  
 In addition, changes in the transaction volume of private homes 
valued between one and two million $HK Granger-caused changes in 
transaction volume for all groups of houses with higher prices. Thus, 
booms or busts in the submarket for low quality housing are passed on 
with a lag to the next highest quality housing, and subsequently from 
this level to higher valued levels. However, no clear causality in 
transactions was found among the pairs 2 to 3 million versus 3 to 5 
million; 2 to 3 million versus 5 to 10 million; and 3 to 5 million versus 5 
to 10 million.  Causality from the lowest category and HOS housing to 
higher categories is clear, while causality from the intermediate price 
categories to higher price categories is less clear.  
 As shown in table 3, the AIC criterion identifies 1 lag for cases (1), 
(2), (3) and (4); 3 lags for case (7). (8), (9) and (10); and 5 lags for case 
(5) and (6). Thus, the evidence suggests that the ripple effect on 
transaction, when it exists, takes one to five months to transmit to the 
higher tiers. 
 
5.3 Tenant Purchase Scheme Effects 
 The above evidence characterizes the Hong Kong housing market 
in general form. Next, we present a specific test of the impact of the 
Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS), which was announced on December 8, 
1997. This program allowed sitting tenants in the public rental housing 
program to purchase their unit at a deep discount from market price. Our 
dependent variable is the monthly number of purchases of existing 
homes in the period surrounding the announcement of the TPS program. 
The first test is of the impact of the announcement of the TPS. We 
create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 during this period and is 
0 before December 1997. We expect the coefficient on this variable to 
be negative.  
 Confounding the analysis of the impact of the TPS was the advent 
of the Asian financial crisis (AFC), this beginning in the third quarter of 
1997 (Tsang and Ma, 2002). We expect that increased uncertainty about 
the HK-US dollar link would discourage purchase of HK dollar 
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denominated assets, particularly homes, and thus reduce turnover. We 
use the difference between the spot exchange rate and the one-year 
forward rate to measure the AFC18 . This measure does not require 
subjective judgment as to when the crisis began and when it phased out. 
It also is highly sensitive to the swings of market confidence during 
financial crises. The variable is normalized and constrained to be 
between zero and unity. We also include in the regression a measure of 
the rate of house price appreciation during the previous year. This value 
is measured by the average price appreciation during the past six months 
as compared to one year earlier. As discussed above, greater house price 
appreciation relaxes households’ down payment constraints and thus 
increases the ability of homeowners to trade up the housing quality 
continuum.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
 The results of the estimation are in Table 4.19 We find that the 
Tenants Purchase Scheme had a significant and large negative impact on 
the volume of residential property transactions. Because our dependent 
variable measures the volume of transactions in the secondary market 
(private and public housing), we are capturing all of the ripple effects 
described above. There is some evidence that the Asian Financial Crisis 
dampened transaction volume, and some evidence that high rates of 
house price appreciation increase transaction volume, but neither 
coefficient is statistically significant.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 While a number of empirical studies have analyzed the spatial 
dispersion of shocks to house prices, we focus on modeling the short run 
dynamic changes of house prices and transaction volume in a single 
market.  Our model highlights the role of wealth shocks to the housing 
market and the resulting domino effect in prices and transactions, 
working through the housing quality continuum.  
 An application of the model is to data from Hong Kong. Shocks to 
the rental housing market were due to changes in the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority’s policies. The first policy change was one that 
                                                 
18 This method was first used by Ho (2000), Chapter 18.  
19 Both the transaction volume and price appreciation series are stationary.  
 20
increased the flow of public housing renters to the private ownership 
market, the second being one that dramatically decreased this flow. We 
find strong evidence that these policy changes resulted in price and 
transactions volume changes throughout the quality continuum, 
spreading from low quality unit to high quality tiers. These results are 
consistent with the predictions of our model of short run housing market 
dynamics and they highlight the interconnectedness of the housing 
market within a locality. It is important to note that our results do not 
prove that changes in wealth were the precise cause of the changes in 
Hong Kong’s housing market, but the observed changes in house prices 
and transaction volumes closely follow the model’s predictions. 
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Appendix 
 
A: The Dynamic Optimization Model 
  
Households maximize the expected present value of utility: 
(A1) Max E(U) = ),(
0
t
t
t chu∑∞
=
δ       
where δ is the discount factor, ct is the composite consumption of 
nonhousing goods and services at time t, h is housing consumption 
which is represented by a composite index of “housing service” of the 
house. In our two-market model, we assume that housing services are 
available in set discrete units with hR < hA < hB, where R indicates rental 
housing, and A and B indicate low- and high-quality owner-occupied 
housing. 
 Homes are purchased only for owners’ occupation. All rented 
units are assumed to be owned by the government, this assumption 
relevant for our particular empirical application, but otherwise 
dispensable. The choice variables for a household are ct and h. ct is a 
continuous variable which is optimized according to its first-order 
condition. h is a discrete choice variable that is chosen among hR, hA ,or 
hB, whichever gives the highest present-value of utility, U. 
 For simplicity, we assume: 
(A2) u(h,ct) ≡ β1ln(h)+β2ln(ct) 
  
A (i) Optimization for Renter Households 
Assume that pR represents the present value of rent to be paid per 
unit of housing if the household remains a tenant indefinitely. Thus, 
pRhR is the present value cost of renting a house in market R. For such a 
tenant, the relevant budget constraint is:  
(A3) Khpqc RRtt
t
t =+∑∞
=0
δ    
where qt is the price of the nonhousing composite good, K includes the 
present value of labor and non-labor income and the value of all assets. 
Because our focus is on the housing market, we simplify by assuming 
that the price of consumption qt, and wealth K are exogenous. 
 To solve the household dynamic optimization problem, we write 
the Lagrangian of the problem as follows (Dixit 1990): 
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The first-order conditions are: 
(A5) ∂ L/∂ ct = tt
t
t q
c
δλβδ −2  = 0   
(A6) ∂ L/∂λ = Khpqc RRtt
t
t =+∑∞
=
.
0
δ .     
Simplifying (A5) yields: 
(A7) ct = 
tqλ
β2 .  
Substituting (A7) into (A6), we have: 
(A8) λ = 
RRRR
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t
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The maximized utility of a renter household is thus: 
(A9) U(hR) = ( )tR
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t
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A (ii) Optimization for Renters Moving to Market A 
 Assume the current price of one unit of housing is ph. That is, pAhA 
is the purchase price of a house in market A. Assume that households 
must pay a fraction of the housing price as a down-payment (1-φL)phh, 
where φL is the loan-to-value ratio. Their mortgage loan φLphh is 
characterized by a fixed interest rate of r and a fixed monthly repayment 
schedule. Then the period fixed-payment (hF) is obtained by solving the 
following present-value formula (Mishkin 2003): 
Loan amount = φL ph h = ∑∑
== +=+
N
t
t
N
t
t r
hF
r
hF
11 )1(
1.
)1(
= F h f(r).  
This equation states that the value of the loan equals to the sum of the 
present value of the period payments. Hence, 
(A10) F = φL ph / f(r). 
The household’s present-value, life-long, wealth K, constraint is:  
hpKhFhpqc h
N
t
t
hLtt
t
t +=+−+ ∑∑
=
∞
= 10
)1( δφδ .   
That is, 
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K includes the present-value of life-long, labor and non-labor income of 
the household and other assets, evaluated before the decision of whether 
to buy a house. If the decision is to buy, then the ex post K becomes K” 
= K + the present value of the house net of outstanding mortgage 
liabilities. If the decision is to remain a renter, then K remains 
unchanged. 
 To solve the household dynamic optimization problem, we write 
the Lagrangian of the problem as follows (Dixit 1990): 
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The first-order conditions are: 
(A13) ∂L/∂ct = tt
t
t q
c
δλβδ −2  = 0,  which gives:  ct = 
tqλ
β2  
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Substituting (A13) into (A14) yields: 
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The maximized utility of a household that bought a house in market A is 
thus: 
(A16) U(hA) = ( )tA
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If the utility of a household as an owner in market A (A16) is greater 
than that as a renter (A9), U(hA)> U(hR), then the household will enter 
market A and buy a house; otherwise, it will rent. A home purchase 
occurs if and only if:  
 0ln)/ln( 221 >
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where ϕA >0 since hA / hR > 1. If and only if K>K*A, will U(hA)> U(hR). 
In this case the household will enter market A to buy a new house; 
otherwise, it will remain a renter. 
 
A (iii) Optimization for Homeowners in Market A Moving to Market B 
 The availability of units in market A for new buyers is subject to 
the willingness of the existing homeowners in that market to sell. This 
willingness depends on their utilities being higher after trading up to 
market B compared with remaining in their home in market A. 
 The wealth of households in market A who are potential buyers in 
market B is: 
KnB(i, t)= KiA(i,t-1)+ pA(t)hA - pA(t-1)hA -Ψm 
where Ψm is the remaining mortgage. Suppressing the time indices t and 
t-1, and rewriting pA(t-1)hA +Ψm as φm, the mean wealth nBK  of the 
potential buyers in market B is given by: 
(A18) mAAiAnB hpKK φ−+=   
where iAK  is the mean wealth of KiA(i,t-1). The lifetime wealth 
constraint is:  
(A19) BBnBB
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Similar to the result of sub-section (ii), we have U(hB)> U(hA) if and 
only if: 
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Define:  
(A20) 0/2/2* 2121 )/()/( BABABBiAABAAABBBB ppKhhphhpK ϕϕϕϕϕ ββββ +−=+−= −− .    
If and only if KnB(i, t)>K*B will U(hB)> U(hA) and the household 
switches homes from market A to B. Otherwise, it will remain in market 
A.   
 
B. Equilibrium Solutions of the Two Housing Market Prices 
 The relationship between pA and pB can be obtained by 
substituting (11) into (16) in the main text: 
(B1) 
BBBB
BBBBBBBBAAmAAiABB
B h
phhphpKh
p γϕτθ
θγϕτγϕτφγτ
+
+−+−+= 0)(2  
 
BBBB
BBBBBmiABBBBBAAA
h
phKhhhp
γϕτθ
θγϕτφγτγτϕ
+
+−−++= 0)(2)2(    
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To find the model’s solution, we also need the market equilibrium 
condition in the low-quality market A. The number of new buyers nA 
[see (10)] in market A plus the initial house owners iA should be equal to 
the developers’ supply plus the number of sellers in market A. The 
number of sellers in market A in turn equals the number of new house 
buyers nB [see (13)] in the high-quality housing market B. That implies: 
(B2) hAnA + hAiA = hAnB + θA( pA - Ap ) + HA.      
Substituting (3), (10), (11), and (13) into (B2) yields: 
(B3)  γA ( 2τ hA 'K - τ ϕA pA hA + τ ϕRA hA )  
  = [ 2τ( iAK  + pA hA - φm) - τ ϕB pB + τ ϕBA pA - τ ϕB0 ]hAγB + θApA - 
Ap θA.  
Substituting (B1) into (B3), we have: 
γA ( 2τ 'K hA - τ ϕA pA hA + τ ϕRA hA ) 
= pA [2τ hA2γB +τ ϕBA hAγB +θA] + 2τ( iAK - φm)hAγB - τ ϕB0hAγB - 
Ap θA 
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Thus a positive shock to the wealth of the potential buyers in the low-
quality housing market will increase its price; that is, 
(B6) 02
'
>∆=
AAA h
Kd
dp γτ . 
This is Proposition 1 of the main text, which is derived directly from 
(B4). To solve for pB, we rewrite (B1) as: 
(B7) B
BBBB
BBBAA
AB h
hh
pp αγϕτθ
γτϕ ++
+= ]2[  
where 
BBBB
BBBBBmiABB
B h
phKh
γϕτθ
θϕγτφγτα +
+−−= 0)(2 . 
Substituting (B4) into (B7): 
(B8) BAAA
BBBB
BBBAA
B K
h
h
hh
p ααγτγϕτθ
γτϕ +


 +∆+
+= '2]2[    
 B
BBBB
BBBAA
A
BBBB
BAABABA
h
hh
K
h
hhh αγϕτθ
γτϕαγϕτθ
ϕγγτ ++
+++∆
+= ]2['
)(
]2[2 2 .  
This expression gives the total effect of the wealth shock on house 
prices in the high quality market, pB. 
 Finally, we prove Proposition 4 that transactions for lower tier 
housing nA will tend to increase transactions for higher tier housing nB. 
Substituting (3) and (10) of the main text into (B2) gives: 
(B9) AA
AA
ARAAA
ABAAA p
nK
nhnh θϕγτ
ϕγττγθ −−++= '2 . 
Hence, 
(B10) 
AAA
A
A
B
hdn
dn
ϕγτ
θ+= 1 >0.  
This proves Proposition 4. 
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Figure 1: Property Transaction Volume in Hong Kong (1984Q1 – 2001Q4) 
 
0.0
10000.0
20000.0
30000.0
40000.0
50000.0
60000.0
70000.0
1
9
8
4
.
1
1
9
8
6
.
1
1
9
8
8
.
1
1
9
9
0
.
1
1
9
9
2
.
1
1
9
9
4
.
1
1
9
9
6
.
1
1
9
9
8
.
1
2
0
0
0
.
1
Notes:  
1) Property transaction volume is measured by the “Agreement for sale and purchase of a 
building unit”. 
2) Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, various issues, Hong Kong Census and Statistics 
Department. 
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
 
Property Type Test on No Trend Trend Conclusion 
Class A Level 1st difference 
-1.739 
-4.153** 
-1.014     
-4.370* 
 
I (1) 
 
Class B Level 1st difference  
-1.729 
-4.562** 
-0.981 
-4.753* 
 
I (1) 
 
Class C Level 1st difference  
-1.527 
-3.900** 
-0.822 
-4.206* 
 
I (1) 
 
Class D Level 1st difference  
-1.519 
-4.206** 
-0.339 
-4.909** 
 
I (1) 
 
Notes: 
1) 95% critical values for the ADF statistic with and without the trend are –2.90 and  
-3.46 respectively, 
2) * Indicates significance at the 5 % level, ** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
3) The optimal lag is determined by AIC criteria. 
 
 
Table 2. Granger Causality Tests of House Price Changes: Period 1982Q1 to 2004Q2 
 
  
Null hypothesis: F-Statistic Probability 
 
Causality
 
(1) CLASS B does not Granger cause CLASS A CLASS A does not Granger cause CLASS B 
1.565 
1.163 
0.214 
0.284 
--- 
 
(2) CLASS C does not Granger cause CLASS A CLASS A does not Granger cause CLASS C 
0.001 
5.716 
0.977 
0.019* A Æ C 
(3) CLASS D does not Granger cause CLASS A CLASS A does not Granger cause CLASS D 
0.678 
5.616 
0.412 
0.020* A Æ D 
(4) CLASS C does not Granger cause CLASS B CLASS B does not Granger cause CLASS C 
0.252 
9.223 
0.874 
0.003** B Æ C 
(5) CLASS D does not Granger cause CLASS B CLASS B does not Granger cause CLASS D 
0.006 
10.113 
0.940 
0.002* B Æ D 
(6) CLASS D does not Granger cause CLASS C CLASS C does not Granger cause CLASS D 
0.303 
4.302 
0.583 
0.041* C Æ D  
Notes:  
1) Akaike’s final prediction error criterion identifies 1 lag for all cases.  
2) * Indicates 5% significance level and ** indicates 1% significance level.  
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Table 3. Granger Causality Tests of Transaction Volume Changes: July 1995 to Jan 2004 
 
 
Null Hypothesis Probability Causality 
(1)  PR 1m <..< 2m does not Granger cause HOS 
HOS does not Granger cause PR 1m <..<2m 
0.321 
0.000***
 
HOS Æ PR 1m<..<2m 
(2) PR 2m < 3m does not Granger cause HOS 
HOS does not Granger cause PR 2m <..<3m 
0.948 
0.002***
 
HOS Æ PR 2m<..<3m 
(3) PR 3m <..< 5m does not Granger cause HOS 
HOS does not Granger cause PR 3m <..<5m 
0.950 
0.002** 
 
HOS Æ PR 3m<..<5m 
(4) PR 5m < ..<10m does not Granger cause HOS 
HOS does not Granger cause PR 5m <..<10m 
0.789 
0.013***
 
HOS Æ PR 5m<..<10m 
(5) PR 2m<..<3m does not Granger cause 1m<..<2m 
PR 1m<..<2m does not Granger cause 2m<..<3m 
0.396 
0.017** 
 
PR 1m<..<2m Æ PR 2m<..<3m 
(6) PR 3m<..<5m does not Granger cause 1m<..<2m 
PR 1m<..<2m does not Granger cause 3m<..<5m 
0.571 
0.066* 
 
PR 1m<..<2m Æ PR 3m<..<5m 
(7) PR 5m<..<10m does not Granger cause 1m<..<2m 
PR 1m<..<2m does not Granger cause 5m<..<10m 
0.981 
0.116* 
 
PR 1m<..<2m Æ PR 5m<..<10m 
(8) PR 3m<..<5m does not Granger cause 2m<..<3m 
PR 2m<..<3m does not Granger cause 3m<5m 
0.686 
0.979 
 
No causality 
(9) PR 5m<..<10m does not Granger cause 2m<..<3m 
PR 2m<..<3m does not Granger cause 5m<..<10m 
0.545 
0.656 
 
No causality 
(10) PR 5m<..<10m does not Granger cause PR 3m<..<5m 
PR 3m<..<5m does not Granger cause PR 5m<..<10M 
0.675 
0.253 
 
No causality 
Notes:   
1) All series are in Log level and are stationary I (0).  
2) Akaike’s final prediction error criterion identifies 1 lag for cases (1), (2), (3) and (4); 3 lags for case (7), 
(8), (9) and (10) and 5 lags for case (5) and (6) 
3) Significance levels are ** 1%, * 5%. 
4) The price ranges are in millions of $HK. 
5) Variable Names: 
HOS - Registrations of Home Ownership Scheme Flats 
PR1M<..<2M - Registrations of Private Residential: 1 to 2 million 
PR2M<..<3M - Registrations of Private Residential: 2 to 3 million 
PR3M<..<5M - Registrations of Private Residential: 3 to 5 million 
PR5M<..<10M - Registrations of Private Residential: 5 to 10 million 
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Table 4. Explaining the Log of Existing Housing Transaction Volume 
 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant  9.265 88.179** 
TPS Dummy -0.843  -5.892** 
Asian Financial Crisis Dummy -0.166  -0.935 
House Price Appreciation Rate  0.002   0.606 
R-bar squared  0.80  
Notes: 
1) Estimation period is for July 1995 to September 2001 using monthly data. 
2) **Indicates a 1% significance level. 
3) DW-statistic = 2.05. 
4) An AR (1) procedure was used to correct for autocorrelation. 
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 Variable list 
A  symbol for low-quality market 
B  symbol for high-quality market 
αA, αB  parameters in equilibrium price formulas  
βc, β1, β2  fixed parameters.  
ct   quantity of composite consumption at time period t 
δ  discount factor of a consumer 
F   fraction of the total housing expenditure that requires a fixed-payment  
   mortgage loan 
Ψm   remaining mortgage of a household 
φm    =pA(t-1)hA +Ψm  
ϕ1, ϕ2h, ϕ2A, ϕ2B fixed parameters.  
ϕB, ϕBA, ϕB0 parameters in the decision rule of switching from market A to B 
ϕA, ϕRA   parameters in the decision rule of switching from rental market to market A 
γB, γB   proportions of households satisfying the lifetime wealth constraint that  
also satisfy the liquid wealth constraint in market A and B, respectively 
h   fixed size of a house  
hR   fixed size of a rental house  
hA, hB   fixed size of a house in market A and B, respectively 
HA, HB   stock of market A and B, respectively 
i  individual i in housing market 
iA*, iB*   number of buyers in market A and B, respectively 
iA, iB  initial number of house owners in market A and B, respectively 
K   present-value of lifetime wealth of the household 
K(i)   lifetime wealth of household i 
K   initial mean lifetime wealth of the renters 
'K   new mean lifetime wealth of renters (with 'K > K ) 
iAK    initial mean lifetime wealth of the home-owners in market A  
nBK    new mean lifetime wealth of the home-owners in market A who are 
potential buyers in market B (with nBK  > iAK ) 
K*A  critical values of mean wealth switching from rental market to market A 
K*B  critical values of mean wealth switching from market A to B 
λ  shadow price of household's dynamic optimization problem 
N  term of the mortgage loan 
nA   number of new buyers in market A 
nB   number of sellers in market A, i.e., new buyers in market B 
Ap , Bp  initial prices of market A and B, respectively 
pA , pB  price of market A and B, respectively 
ph   housing price  
pR   rental price of housing 
qt   price of composite consumption at time period t 
r  interest rate of the mortgage loan 
SA, SB   supply of market A and B, respectively 
τ  slope parameter in the household wealth distribution function 
θA ,θB  parameters of supply function for market A and B, respectively 
u(.,.)  utility function 
U(.)  present-value of the utility 
W  liquid wealth of a household 
